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RECOVERY GREATLY IN EXCESS OF ORIGINAL COST OF AUTOMOBILE
ALLOWED IN KENTUCKY UNDER ACTUAL CASH VALUE PROVISION
OF INSURANCE POLICY
It was formerly held in an action on an automobile loss and damage insur-
ance policy1 that the actual selling price, less depreciation, should determine the
amount of recovery when the insurer is obligated by the policy to pay the "actual
cash value." Thus, it readily appears that under normal conditions, if a person
purchases a new automobile and uses it for a period of six months, the effect is
a depreciation in the value of the automobile as that term is used in the insurance
contract. If a car has been insured at the time of its purchase for its "actual
cash value," is it possible for the amount of recovery within the terms of the
insurance policy to exceed the price originally paid and on which the premium
rate was based?
When normal conditions exist in the used car market, the answer to the fore-
going query will probably be in the negative. However, the Kentucky Court of
Appeals recently decided this question in the affirmative. A consideration of the
used car market conditions at that time will demonstrate the wisdom of the
decision. In State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cox,3 the insured had purchased an
automobile for $1,898.98, and had later insured it, inter alia, against theft with
the defendant insurance company. The policy wis obtained for the "actual
cash value" of the automobile and this phrase was written into the policy on a
blank space, as is the usual practice in Kentucky. Approximately six months
later the car was stolen and in an action by the insured to recover on the policy,
a verdict was rendered for the insured m the amount of $2,082.12. Only $82.12
of this was expense incurred by reason of deprivation of the car; the remaining
$2,000 constituted the "actual cash value."
On the surface, this amount appears excessive, but the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky in a well-reasoned opimon affirmed the action of the lower court. The
Appellate Court recognized that the abnormal conditions of the automobile market
in the past decade had caused " a tremendous boost in the market value of
used cars under the old law of supply and demand and it is a matter of common
knowledge that many slightly used cars sold for up to twice the dealer s retail
price of new cars."' The amount of the verdict had been based on the testimony
of experts as to the price for which the car could have been sold in the used car
market at the time it was stolen, and the Court affirmed because it was of the
opinion that "actual cash value" was the price the automobile would bring in the
market regardless of the price that insured had paid for it.
The Insurance Company had contended to no avail that liability should be
limited to the price of the automobile when it was new, since the policy used
was developed durng a period when the original purchase price was the greatest
1General Exchange Ins. Corporation v. Kinney, 279 Kv. 76, 129 S.W. 2d 1014
(1939).
- Id. at 84, 129 SM. 2d at 1018.
309 Ky. 480, 218 S.W 2d 46 (1949).
4 Id. at 484, 218 S.W. 2d at 48.
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value of the automobile, and since this was the value on which its premium rate
was fixed.- The Court stated that inasmuch as the changed market conditions
were in existence at the time the policy was issued, and were no doubt known by
the 2rstrer, that it would have been easy for it, to limit its liability by writing in
a few qualifying words. The Court is consistent, for in a previous decision it
stated, "It is not unreasonable to require the insurance company to limit liability,
if it so desires, by clear and unambiguous language."' And it has further been
established by other decisions of the Court of Appeals that an insurer can insert
in its policies as many provisions to limit the liability thereon as is deemed proper
provided such provisions are not unreasonable or contrary to public policy.-
The insurer, in the instant case, rather than limiting its liability in clear and
unambiguous language, used such language to extend it. The phrase "actual
cash value" which was written into the blank space on the policy has an estab-
lished meaning supported by many decisions,' as the Court demonstrates. The
many cases interpret the phrase to mean the cash market price at the time and
place of the happemng of the insured event. Thus, with knowledge that used
cars were being quoted at a higher price than new cars, the insurer used a phrase
in its contract covering a new car which gave the insured the benefit of the higher
used car price. Courts must construe the insurance contract as it is written,"
according to its plain meamng" and in case of doubt it is the general practice to
construe it against the insurer. If an insurance company continues to issue
policies without modification after judicial construction of certain provisions, it is
in an unfavorable position to clmm that the policies do not cover risks they have
been adjudicated to cover in the previous decisions concerning such provisions.'2
The principal of indenmity is the basis of the contract of insurance on
property.' The insurer contracts to indemnify the assured, that is, to place him
in as good a condition despite the happemng of the insured event as he would
have enjoyed had no loss occurred. If conditions of the used car market had
been normal and the car had depreciated by subsequent use, then, as has been
mentioned previously, the actual cash value would have been the actual selling
price less depreciation. The amount so amved at should equal or closely approxi-
Id. at 485, 218 S.W 2d at 48.
Independence Ins. Co. v. Jefferies Adni r, 294 Ky. 690, 696, 172 S.W 2d 566,
56t9 (1943).
-General Exchange Ins. Corporation v. Kinney, 297 Ky. 76, 129 S.W 2d 1014
(1939); Equitable Life Assurance Socxety of the United States v. Adams, 269 Ky. 726,
83 S.W 2d 461 (1935): Bahre v. Travelers Protective Ass'n, of America, 211 Ky. 435.
277 S.W 467 (1925).
2 WORDS AkND PHAss, p. 221 et seq. (Perm. Ed.).
New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Pickrell, 230 Ky. 354, 19 S.W 2d 955 (1929).
Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States v. Hall, 253 Ky. 450.
69 S.W 2d 977 (1934).
" John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Tabb, 273 Ky. 649, 117 S.W 2d 587 (1938);
General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Lois ille Home Telephone Co.,
175 Ky. 96. 193 SAV 1031 (1917); Farmers' Mutual Equity Insurance Society v. Smith,
158 Ky. 459, 165 SAV 675 (1914); Phoenix Ins. C. v. Spiers & Thomas, 87 Ky. 285,
8 S.W 153 (1888).
-' Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Harris, 254 Ky. 23, 70 S.W. 2d 949
(1934).
12VANcE, INsuP-xcr sec. 30 (3rd ed. 1930): McAnarney v. Newark Fire Inis, Co,,
247 N. Y. 176, 159 N.E. 902 (1928).
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mate the market value of the automobile,1' with which sum the insured could
replace the automobile if he so desired. Considering that indemnity is the legiti-
mate purpose of the insurance contract, should the insurer be heard to complain
because the market has now advanced to his disadvantage? Or as the Court in
the case under discussion queries:
"Assuming that lie, the insured, had to go into the market
to buy a car for his immediate use to replace the stolen car, was not
the inflated market pnce the price he would have had to pay rather
than some theoretical price at which he might have obtained a car
when, as and if, he could have obtained one from a dealer at some
unknown distant date?"'-
The Court in this case stated that the exact question involved here had not
been passed upon in Kentucky, nor had the Court been cited to any decisions' of
other jurisdictions in regard to the question. Two explanations are submitted for
the dearth of precedents. In the first place, although conditions existed during
World War II which might have advanced the price of slightly used cars beyond
the price of the new cars, the Emergency Price Control Act'" prevented such
advances by fixing prices. It is common knowledge, however, that the dealer s
list prices of the new automobiles did not represent the true cash values of the
automobiles inasmuch as most new car dealers engaged in illegal conduct com-
monly denominated "bhck marketeenng." In this regard, dealers would require
a used car to be "traded in" on a new car and would credit the purchaser with
little or nothing on the price of the new car.
Although the War Powers Act fixed and determined the list prices of auto-
mobiles, it did not, as one case has pointed out,"7 attempt to regulate or control
adjustments for insurance loss. Thus, it appears that if a court during price
regulation had found that the sale price of an automobile included not only the
cash actually paid, but also the loss sustained on the traded-in automobile, it is
possible the insured might have recovered in excess of the ceiling or list price.
But it is doubtful that many courts could or would have taken judicial notice of
the illegal transaction in the "black market" or allowed proof of such a trans-
action to be the basis of a finding by the jury that the actual cash value of an
automobile was more than the purchase at list price. To do so would have
approximated a judicial sanction of the illegal practices which would have been
contrary to both the spirit and purpose of price fixing. However, in State Auto.
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cox, in the absence of Price Control, the Court was able to
acknowledge that the loss realized on the trade-in was as much a part of the
cost of the automobile as the cash paid.
14 In Gibson v. Glen Falls Ins. Co. 11 Neb. 827, 197 N.W 950 (1924) market
value was the criterion for determinng recovery under auto theft policy when auto
had been stolen; cf. L. A. Haussler v. Indemnity Company of Amerca, 227 111. App.
504 (1923).
16State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cox, 309 Ky. 480, 484, 218 S.W 2d 46, 48 (1949).
"i SECOND WVAR POWERS Acr sec. 101 et seq., 50 U.S.C.A. App. sec. 631 et seq.
'I See General Exchange Ins. Corporation v. Tierney. 152 F. 2d 224, 225 (C.C..\.
5th 1945) where an insured who had purchased ai automobile prior to price control
was permitted to recover in excess of the ceiling price under auto fire policy insur-
ing for purchase price,
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Secondly, it is suggested that the probability that the assured would lose
more by going to court than by settling was conducive to settlement with the
insurance company rather than resort to litigation. After attorney's fees and
other expenses of the action (excluding court costs probably borne by the de-
fendant) are deducted from the gross recovery, it is possible that assured's financial
position will be slightly, if any, better than if he had accepted the amount offered
by the insurer. Although it is difficult to conceive how the court could have
arrived at any other proper conclusion under the circumstances in the pnncipal
case, nevertheless, until this adjudication actually acquired the status of a prece-
dent, insured parties might well have been reluctant to expend money and time
on litigation when a favorable decision and financial gain were so uncertain.
By establishing what is believed to be a valid precedent, the Kentucky Court
of Appeals fixed the rights of the parties in a salutary manner which serves to
reduce uncertainty in an important field of contemporary commerce.
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